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Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Security Council the twenty-first quarterly report on the activities of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) (see annex). It is submitted by the Acting Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC in accordance with paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999) of 17 December 1999.

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Annex

Twenty-first quarterly report on the activities of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission in accordance with paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999)

I. Introduction

1. The present report, which is the twenty-first[a] submitted in accordance with paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999), covers the activities of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) during the period from 1 March to 31 May 2005.

II. Developments

2. During the period under review, the Acting Executive Chairman has continued the practice of briefing the respective Presidents of the Security Council, representatives of Member States and officials of the Secretariat on the activities of UNMOVIC.

Status of sites, dual-use equipment and materials subject to monitoring

3. The Commission's previous report (S/2005/129) mentioned that UNMOVIC had contacted Iraq's neighbours to determine whether dual-use items subject to monitoring had found their way into or through their countries. Of the two remaining Governments from which a response had been awaited, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran informed UNMOVIC on 14 March that after a thorough investigation by the various authorities and relevant organizations, the Government had concluded that no scrap had found its way into or through scrap yards in Iran. No response has been received so far from the Government of Saudi Arabia.

4. UNMOVIC imagery analysts have continued the ongoing review of the status of sites subject to inspection and monitoring in Iraq. Of the 411 sites inspected in the period from November 2002 to March 2003, Commission experts have acquired and examined post-war high-resolution imagery covering 378 sites, including those considered the most important. As part of the continuing examination and analysis, experts have determined to date that 109 of the sites (of which 90 had been identified in the Commission's previous report) were cleaned to varying degrees. Further analysis revealed that dual-use equipment and materials subject to monitoring have been removed totally from 52 sites, and partially from 44 sites which suffered less damage. Additionally, at 13 sites, some equipment and materials that were stored in the open have been removed. No conclusion can be drawn concerning the presence or absence of equipment or materials inside undamaged buildings, nor the destination of all items removed.

[a] The Commission's 20 previous reports were issued as documents S/2000/516, S/2000/835, S/2000/1134, S/2001/177, S/2001/515, S/2001/833, S/2001/1126, S/2002/195, S/2002/606, S/2002/981, S/2002/1303, S/2003/232, S/2003/580, S/2003/844, S/2003/1135, S/2004/160, S/2004/435, S/2004/693, S/2004/924 and S/2005/129.

5. Approximately 7,900 items of dual-use equipment and material (130 biological, 4,780 chemical and 3,000 missile-related) covered by the UNMOVIC plan for ongoing monitoring and verification and the export/import monitoring mechanism were known to have been located among the 109 sites through declarations by Iraq and UNMOVIC inspections. Significant quantities of dual-use raw material were also known to have been present at those sites. From the imagery analysis UNMOVIC has concluded that biological sites were less damaged (only 12 of the 109 are biological sites). The fact that such facilities are generally smaller-sized units and were probably better protected through local security arrangements may account for the lesser damage and the smaller numbers of equipment and items removed from them.

6. Dual-use equipment and materials like those removed from sites in Iraq can be used for legitimate purposes. However, they can also be utilized for prohibited purposes if in a good state of repair and integrated in a production line in a suitable environment. Some of the most significant dual-use equipment removed from the 109 sites currently under review is addressed in the following tables with respect to its categories, numbers and utilities.

Table 1
Biological-related equipment

Items	*Number removed versus total recorded in Iraq*	*Comments*
Biosafety cabinets/glove boxes	14 of 259 (5%)	Equipment for handling micro-organisms.
Shaker incubators	7 of 71 (10%)	Laboratory and small-scale production sizes.
Fermenters, bioreactors and jacketed tanks	37 of 405 (9%)	Range in size from a few litres to about 5,000 litres, many old or in various states of repair.
Centrifuges, separators, decanters, filter presses	17 of 187 (9%)	Downstream processing equipment not used for bulk agent production in the past biological warfare programme. Includes some small laboratory or bench-top centrifuges.
Spray, freeze and drum driers	12 of 190 (6%)	Varying sizes but many small bench-top models for research and development.

7. One of the biological-related sites which suffered major damage was Ibn Al Baytar, a research, development and pilot production scale facility for pharmaceutical products. Of the other sites, the most significant included Fallujah III and the Rasheed military complex (hospital, laboratory and stores).

8. The equipment at the sites mentioned in the preceding paragraph and table 1 included a full range of fermentation vessels from laboratory scale (8 litres) to full production scale (5,000 litres) as well as preparation and downstream processing equipment such as biosafety cabinets and freeze dryers. The state of repair of this equipment, however, varied considerably from good working order to a poor state which meant that it could be refurbished only at high cost.

Table 2
Chemical-related equipment

Items	*Number removed versus total recorded in Iraq*	*Comments*
Reactor vessels	53 of 98 (54%)	Equipment to conduct wide range of chemical reactions; due to its characteristics, this equipment can be used for the production of both commercial chemicals and chemical warfare agents and their precursors.
Heat exchangers/ condensers	142 of 310 (45%)	Important parts of chemical installations, complementary to reactors in chemical processes; essential for quality and safety.
Distillation/absorption columns	173 of 272 (63%)	
Scrubbers and separators	14 of 28 (50%)	
Storage tanks and vessels	286 of 1,217 (24%)	Usually used as feeding tanks for starting materials and for final product storage, intermediate and long-term. Those made of fibreglass also have various other common applications such as water or sewage tanks.

9. In addition, other dual-use equipment and items such as 628 metal sheets of Monel and Inconel, 3,380 valves, 107 pumps and over 13 kilometres of pipes were known to have been located among the chemical sites of relevance. The Qaa Qaa industrial complex was among the sites possessing the greatest quantity of dual-use production equipment, whose fate is now unknown. Of all the items listed above, one third had been used at the complex. Another significant portion of such items was located at the Fallujah II and Fallujah III facilities. Spare parts and raw materials were stored at the Khan Dari Stores belonging to the Ibn Yunis Research Centre.

10. The sites mentioned in the preceding paragraph possessed dual-use equipment of all types and characteristics. The equipment was constructed of material considered as most relevant for chemical warfare-related purposes. It included reactors with volumes between 100 and 3,000 litres, heat exchangers, distillation columns and other parts adjusted to that volume range. Most of the equipment was in working condition and operational.

Table 3
Missile-related equipment and materials

Items	*Number removed versus total recorded in Iraq*	*Comments*
Solid propellant production equipment	94 of 132 (71%)	Mixers, grinders, casting chambers, kneading machines, extrusion presses, curing ovens, etc.
Missile hardware production equipment	289 of 340 (85%)	Flow-forming and hot spinning machines, vacuum furnaces, computer numerically controlled/ multi-axis milling and turning machines and other equipment such as welding machines, presses, moulds, etc.
Testing equipment	85 of 169 (50%)	Test equipment for liquid propellant missile subsystems, three-dimensional measurement machines, balancing machines for turbo-pumps, equipment for static motor/engine firing tests, test equipment for guidance, navigation and control systems, and other test equipment such as X-ray machines, hydrostatic pressure test equipment, etc.
Missile subsystems and components	1,453 of 1,611 (90%)	Including liquid propellant engines, guidance, navigation and control items and other parts such as air bottles, SA-2 batteries, pressure-reducing valves, etc.
Raw materials	573 of 637 metric tons (90%)	Including ammonium perchlorate, aluminium powder, hydroxy-terminated polybutadiene (HTPB), ethylene propylene diene monomer (EPDM), maraging steel, etc.

11. Of the 109 sites analysed from satellite imagery and determined to have been cleaned to some degree, 58 had been under monitoring for missile activities. The 58 sites (containing equipment shown in table 3 above) include several of the key production sites for both solid and liquid propellant missiles. At these sites there were hundreds of additional pieces of less significant dual-use machinery, essentially of types found in any general engineering production facility or workshop.

12. At the Kadhimiya and Al Samoud factory sites, where airframes and engines for liquid propellant missiles were manufactured and final assembly work was carried out, all equipment and missile components have been removed. At the Fateh site, where similar production activities occurred, some of the equipment has been removed.

13. In relation to solid propellant missile production, all equipment has been removed from the Mutasim site, where final missile assembly and testing for Iraq's larger missiles were carried out. All equipment and raw materials were removed from the Mamoun site, where all solid propellant was produced. At the Tho Al Fekar factory, which also manufactured hardware components for missiles, all significant equipment was removed.

14. Essentially all items included in table 3 above were in working condition, with the exception of six (out of 12) flow-forming machines which were substantially damaged to various degrees.

Addenda to the comprehensive report of the Iraq Survey Group

15. On 25 April, Charles Duelfer, the Special Adviser to the Director of Central Intelligence of the United States of America, issued a series of addenda to his earlier comprehensive report of 2004 and released a revised version of the report with minor editing changes. A note accompanying the addenda states that they complete the record of the Special Adviser on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, but that further information will become available over time. The Special Adviser also notes that "for now, the report is the best picture that could be drawn concerning the events, programmes, policies and underlying dynamics of the relationship of the former regime to weapons of mass destruction over the last three decades". However, he observes that substantial efforts continue to be made to examine documents that have been recovered from the former regime and that it will take several months at least to go through all remaining documents.

16. The report notes that site visits were terminated in November 2004 due to security concerns. There also continue to be reports of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq but the Iraq Survey Group has found that such reports are usually scams or result from the misidentification of materials or activities. In a very limited number of cases they have related to findings of old chemical munitions produced before 1990.

17. With respect to residual proliferation concerns, the accompanying note assesses that the risk of Iraqi expertise or material advancing the weapons of mass destruction potential in other countries is attenuated by many factors and is presently small but not to be ignored and that, so far, insurgent efforts to attain unconventional weapons have been limited and contained by coalition actions. Instances cited in the comprehensive report concerning the possible movement of

weapons of mass destruction or related materials from Iraq prior to the war remain unresolved. The possibility of discovering mobile biological warfare capability is assessed as still possible but very unlikely. If there were to be a surprise discovery in the future, the report underlines that it would most likely be in the biological weapons area since the signature and facilities for these efforts are small compared to other types of weapons of mass destruction.

18. From the standpoint of UNMOVIC, new information is presented on the organizational structure and functions of the Military Industrialization Commission of Iraq up to 2003, but most of this information has little impact on the status of Iraq's disarmament. The addenda do not change the previous assessment and comments made by UNMOVIC with regard to the comprehensive report of October 2004. Some information presented in the addenda differs in detail from information and documents UNMOVIC possesses. However, it appears that most of the information comes from interviews with individuals and is based mainly on their recollections. With respect to Iraq's programmes, UNMOVIC is in possession of comprehensive information, compiled on the basis of multiple sources of information, which will be presented in the UNMOVIC compendium (see paras. 20-22 below).

19. On the issue of the status of dual-use items and former weapons sites subject to monitoring, the limited assessments of the Iraq Survey Group provided in the addenda and statements to the media in March by the Deputy Minister of Industry of Iraq corroborate information already obtained by UNMOVIC through satellite imagery assessment.

Compendium

20. The Commission has continued its work on the compendium of Iraq's proscribed weapons and programmes. The first draft was compiled by UNMOVIC in March 2005, as foreshadowed in the Commission's twentieth report (S/2005/129). The draft attempts to provide a detailed technical description of Iraq's proscribed weapons and programmes with an emphasis on lessons that can be drawn from both the nature of the programmes and the experience gained in the process of their verification by United Nations inspectors.

21. All information resources available to the Commission have been used for the work on the compendium. These include various sets of declarations submitted by Iraq, reports of inspections conducted by both the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and UNMOVIC, notes of discussions and interviews with Iraqi personnel, documents provided by Iraq and those found independently by inspectors, including those originating from forensic computer exploitation and aerial imagery, and information provided to the Commission by Governments. The draft also builds on subject studies already completed by the Commission such as the Al Samoud-2 missile study, the UNMOVIC guide to Iraq's special weapons, the remotely piloted vehicle and unmanned aerial vehicle study, the guide to the Military Industrialization Commission of Iraq and the study of Iraq's procurement network. A number of these were summarized in appendices to previous quarterly reports on the activities of UNMOVIC.

22. The Commission continues its work on the harmonization of the draft of the compendium and the lessons that can be drawn from this work. Examples of such lessons on specific issues are outlined in the appendix to the present report.

III. Other activities

External technical expert panel review of the ongoing monitoring and verification plan (biological provisions)

23. The Commission's last report (S/2005/129) mentioned that the College of Commissioners had been briefed on the results of the expert panel review of the biological provisions of the ongoing monitoring and verification plan. As circumstances in Iraq have changed since 2003, and given advances in science and technology, UNMOVIC reviewed the methodology and process of monitoring dual-use biological facilities and related material. In November 2004, UNMOVIC convened a panel of external non-governmental technical experts (from Brazil, France, Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America) to conduct an independent review of the biological provisions and associated annex of the ongoing monitoring and verification plan. They were asked to review, from a technical basis, the appropriateness, applicability and logic of the provisions and annex as they now stand. The results of their review are set out below.

24. An underlying assumption of the panel's recommendations was that appropriate supporting national legislation would be in place. The panel suggested that Iraq could be assisted in the drafting and implementation of national legislation and compliance with international obligations as well as in the establishment of a good records and documentation system which would help the monitoring and verification process. The panel identified several fundamental criteria for its ongoing monitoring and verification review, including that the monitoring system should be transparent and unambiguous for all users (UNMOVIC, Iraqi personnel/Government and suppliers) to avoid confusion and foster a high degree of compliance.

25. The panel identified the following criteria to be the triggers for declarations under the monitoring plan:

(a) *Containment*: Sites or facilities, fixed or mobile, meeting the criteria of the World Health Organization (WHO) of high or maximum containment for work with human and animal pathogens, or with containment for working with plant diseases;

(b) *Activities*: Declaration of sites or facilities, fixed or mobile, with activities that encompass possession, storage, destruction and work with agents; any activity involving genetic modification of an agent or transfer of genetic elements from an agent; any activities involving the breeding of vectors of human, animal or plant diseases, or pests; activities involving micro-encapsulation of live micro-organisms or proteinaceous substances; biodefence activities; and any activities involving vaccination of humans against botulism, smallpox or anthrax. In addition, activities were to include the growth of agents in embryonated eggs, and aggregate production in equipment types and size not captured in the list of equipment and micro-organisms contained in the annex to the plan;

(c) *International transfer*: Transfers of agents and equipment;

(d) *Equipment*: The annex contains lists of equipment, materials and micro-organisms the possession or use of which would in itself trigger the need for a site or facility to submit a monitoring declaration. The current equipment list consists of

many entries that are described in most cases generically, i.e. any equipment that can perform a certain function or activity, with only examples listed. The panel recommended for reasons of transparency and practicality that all equipment be more clearly defined. It accepted that a number of items could be removed from monitoring. The panel identified several criteria as the basis for selecting equipment that should be part of an effective monitoring regime. It reviewed each entry of the equipment list and, in general, its recommendations in the equipment list were in broad agreement with those proposed by UNMOVIC experts. The list proposed by the panel, if adopted, would result in an equipment declaration that is more focused on production, downstream processing and dissemination;

(e) *Agents*: The panel developed criteria for inclusion of micro-organisms and toxins in the ongoing monitoring and verification plan with the aim of focusing on selected agents and eliminating shortcomings of the existing lengthy lists. The entries in these lists encompass many micro-organisms with low human pathogenicity, most animal and plant pathogens and a variety of simulants. The criteria defined and used by the panel are as follows: (i) biological agents and toxins known to have been effectively weaponized by Iraq but also reported in open sources to have been weaponized in other biological warfare programmes elsewhere; (ii) biological agents and toxins known to have been subject to attempts to weaponize; and (iii) biological agents and toxins relatively easy to weaponize because of their properties. The panel noted that the current threats had changed, especially in the plant pathogen area, where the perceived threat has changed from large-scale to small-scale attacks.

26. By applying the defined criteria, the panel developed a more concise and considerably shorter list. There is generally a close correlation between the panel's results and those of the UNMOVIC review.

27. The panel recommended that if there is an intention to include other biological agents capable of being developed as economic weapons, then certain animal pathogens should be included, as well as plant pathogens and some pests of high socio-economic importance.

IV. Other issues

Field offices

28. UNMOVIC retains a core staff of nine local nationals in Baghdad who maintain the existing offices, laboratories and other equipment at the Canal Hotel. During the reporting period, the local staff conducted a detailed inventory of UNMOVIC communication gear and equipment in the laboratories. Some communication equipment has been loaned to the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) and much of the non-expendable equipment of UNMOVIC has been secured in containers.

29. The Cyprus field office provides for storage and limited maintenance of inspection and monitoring equipment, and could be used as a staging area for staff and logistics support should UNMOVIC activities resume in Iraq. Two experts visited the field office in April to check the serviceability and completeness of the equipment. While there, they conducted an orientation course for the field office staff in emergency response to hazardous materials. Six United Nations personnel

from the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) also participated in this training. The field office shipped to Vienna detection and protective equipment necessary to support the multidisciplinary training course held there from 2 to 13 May. Whenever appropriate, the staff of the field office has continued to provide logistics support to UNFICYP and UNAMI.

Staffing

30. Core UNMOVIC staff in the Professional category at Headquarters at present total 50 weapons experts and other personnel drawn from 24 nationalities, nine of whom are women.

Technical visits, meetings and workshops

31. UNMOVIC experts participated in several international conferences during the period under review. Experts attended an international conference in the United Kingdom on chemical demilitarization, at which technology relevant to UNMOVIC was discussed. Two UNMOVIC technical specialists attended the Pittsburgh Conference in the United States of America early in March. The conference presented the latest techniques in biological and chemical detection and diagnostic methods. On behalf of UNMOVIC, a roster expert attended the International Conference on Biosafety and Biorisks held in Lyons (France) in March 2005, which was organized by the Center for Biosecurity and WHO. Another UNMOVIC roster expert attended a meeting of the New Defence Agenda bioterrorism reporting group held in Brussels in April 2005.

32. UNMOVIC carried out technical seminars in New York on new techniques in detection of early protein markers for chemical and biological agents. A consultant on government regulation of vaccine and biological product development presented aspects and procedures of inspecting and auditing biotechnology and vaccine facilities through paper audit, quality assurance verification and interviews.

33. Two UNMOVIC biological experts were invited to Japan to brief the Japanese Government and members of the scientific and technical community on UNMOVIC inspection activity, focusing on inspection methodology and possible implications for future United Nations or other verification regimes. Briefings and discussions took place over three days in March.

34. A number of UNMOVIC staff attended the Interphex exhibition in New York in April. The exhibition displays the latest developments in dual-use equipment and production techniques related primarily to the biological and pharmaceutical industries.

Training

35. During the reporting period, UNMOVIC conducted two training courses for its roster inspectors. The second enhanced missile course was held in Germany from 7 to 18 March. Sixteen experts from 14 countries participated in the course, whose objective was to develop practical skills for inspection and monitoring of dual-use production equipment and capabilities in the missile area. The course included familiarization visits to relevant facilities as well as a practical inspection exercise.

36. The second advanced multidisciplinary course was conducted in Austria from 2 to 13 May with 16 participants from 13 countries. Its objective was to enhance the

capabilities of multidisciplinary teams to carry out inspections of sites that had not been previously inspected. The course included a computer-based desktop simulation of inspections at chemical, biological and missile facilities. It also included a practical inspection exercise at a facility made available by the host Government.

37. The Commission is grateful to the Governments of Germany and Austria for their support for its recent training activities.

38. Since the first training course in July 2000, UNMOVIC has conducted 30 training courses, including seven basic and 11 advanced courses. These courses enabled the inspectors to assess requirements for the monitoring of a specific dual-use facility or technology and design appropriate inspection/monitoring regimes for such facilities using an optimum set of tools and procedures. Emphasis has recently been placed on multidisciplinary approaches to training and inspection.

39. In order to conduct its training, UNMOVIC has created specific programmes, study materials, manuals, handbooks and videos for various types of training; established a cadre of experienced instructors, mainly from its Headquarters staff; developed a unique set of training exercises and tutorials to develop and reinforce required inspectors' skills; identified and adapted a number of facilities worldwide suitable for training activities, including mock inspections, practical exercises and familiarization visits; and established administrative, logistical and supporting infrastructure for effective training.

V. College of Commissioners

40. On 11 March, Susan Burk (United States of America) informed the Secretary-General that she had been assigned new duties at the Department of State and therefore wished to tender her resignation as an UNMOVIC Commissioner with immediate effect. The Secretary-General appointed Stephen G. Rademaker (United States of America) as her successor on 23 May 2005.

41. The UNMOVIC College of Commissioners convened in New York for its nineteenth regular session on 24 and 25 May 2005. As on previous occasions, observers from the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons attended the session.

42. The Acting Executive Chairman briefed the Commissioners on the activities of UNMOVIC since their last meeting. Presentations were made to the College on the status of work related to "small quantities" of biological and chemical weapons material and on steps involved in the investigation of suspect biological locations (taking into consideration lessons learned from experience in Iraq).

43. The College welcomed the introductory statement by the Acting Executive Chairman. This dealt with work related to ongoing monitoring and verification and the possible need for monitoring in Iraq for end-use verification of dual-use items for a transitional period. The College also welcomed the extensive presentations by UNMOVIC staff on monitoring of small quantities of chemical and biological warfare agents and assessments of sites in the biological area. The College commended the considerable work being undertaken within the Commission and encouraged the continuation of this work, in particular relating to the compendium, training and additional studies concerning ongoing monitoring and verification.

44. The College took note of the fact that the work of the Iraq Survey Group in its search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq seemed to have effectively come to an end with the publication in April of a revised version of the comprehensive report released by the Group in October 2004, and addenda thereto.

45. The College noted the statement of the Acting Executive Chairman that several significant questions relating to Iraq's disarmament remained. It expressed the hope that at the appropriate time the Security Council would address the question of how it would proceed with the confirmation of Iraq's disarmament. The College will continue to discuss proposals, including those made by outside bodies and organizations, concerning the future of the Commission, in particular such matters as any requirement for future ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq, any requirement for monitoring imports and exports of dual-use items and any requirement for the retention of the Commission's expertise. The College acknowledged that these issues were for the Security Council to decide upon, as was the timing of any Security Council discussion.

46. It was tentatively decided to hold the next meeting of the College on 24 and 25 August.

47. In accordance with paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999), the Commissioners were consulted on the contents of the present report.

Appendix

Examples of lessons learned in the course of the work on the compendium

Example 1 — Uncovering the scope of Iraq's work on the chemical warfare agent VX

1. In 1991, Iraq declared that it had carried out laboratory research on VX. By 1995, UNSCOM uncovered evidence that the scope of Iraq's activities on VX was much broader. Consequently, in 1996 Iraq declared the production of 3.9 metric tons of VX, the production of 60 metric tons of key VX precursors and the acquisition of some 650 metric tons of other precursors for the production of VX. Iraq also acknowledged that it had decided to conceal various aspects of its VX activities from UNSCOM and, in 1991, had unilaterally destroyed all VX and key precursors it had produced and some 150 metric tons of other precursors it had procured as well as documents and records relevant to VX.

2. Whether an earlier voluntary disclosure by Iraq of its work on VX could have contributed to fully clarifying this matter can only be the subject of speculation. However, it is obvious that the unilateral destruction, admitted by Iraq, prolonged the verification process, led to the elimination of physical evidence essential for complete verification and left serious uncertainties regarding the quantities of VX produced and its disposition. In 2002, due to these uncertainties, UNMOVIC identified the issue of VX as one of the remaining unresolved disarmament issues. In March 2003, it included this issue in the list of key remaining disarmament tasks (required under the terms of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999)). The Iraq Survey Group also reported that Iraq had not adequately explained and accounted for its VX production and weaponization.

3. The VX verification experience makes it clear that only a sophisticated verification system comprising various verification tools and techniques is capable of uncovering evidence of past undeclared activities. The verification of procurement data revealed the acquisition of large quantities of precursors by Iraq; document searches resulted in the discovery of some records on VX-related activities; interviews with Iraqi scientists and technicians helped to identify gaps in Iraq's declarations on VX; debriefings of defectors produced additional information on the weaponization of VX; information from former suppliers to Iraq helped to corroborate the procurement data; and sampling and analysis identified the presence of VX degradation products. All of the above in combination with on-site inspections led to the identification of the indisputable existence of undeclared activities related to VX.

4. The multidisciplinary verification approach also helped to uncover additional evidence on VX. In 1998, UNSCOM decided to re-examine through sampling and analysis unilaterally destroyed special warheads for Al Hussein missiles. This issue was important for all three verification areas, missile, chemical and biological, since it was linked to the determination of the total number of special missile warheads destroyed and their types and composition. Degradation products of VX were found on missile warhead fragments by one national laboratory. Iraq, however, disputed these analytical results. Later in 1998, other missile warhead fragments were sampled in Iraq. The samples were analysed by three national laboratories. All three laboratories reported the presence of a decontamination compound, and one

laboratory identified a possible degradation product of a nerve agent, but not necessarily VX.

5. Specific technical knowledge had been gained from the experience of sampling and analysis in the course of the VX investigation. One is that sampling and analysis should be performed at the earliest stages of verification and be considered as a routine procedure to collect more verification data rather than an extraordinary measure to verify specific concerns. It should be noted that traces of VX degradation products on chemical process equipment were found only in 1997, after VX production had been established and the specific production plant used by Iraq for that purpose had been identified. Special missile warhead fragments that had initially been verified in 1992 were finally subject to thorough sampling and analysis only in 1998. The following additional procedures for sampling and analysis were introduced by UNMOVIC in the light of this experience:

(a) Samples were to be independently analysed by at least two approved outside laboratories following existing chain-of-custody procedures;

(b) One portion of each sample was to be given to Iraq and another retained by UNMOVIC as a reference;

(c) All samples, as well as raw data and analytical results generated in the course of analyses by the outside laboratories, were to be the property of UNMOVIC;

(d) All conclusions and assessments of analytical results were to be the responsibility of UNMOVIC.

Example 2 — Missile monitoring

6. Under Security Council resolution 687 (1991), Iraq is prohibited from possessing ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres. Thus, missiles remaining in Iraq that exceeded the limit set by the Security Council, as well as their major parts, repair and production facilities, were subject to destruction, removal or rendering harmless under international supervision. The plan for ongoing monitoring and verification approved by Security Council resolution 715 (1991) expanded the prohibition and applied it to any delivery system capable of a range greater than 150 kilometres regardless of payload and to any related major parts and components.

7. The possession and development of missile systems within the permitted range was not prohibited to Iraq but was subject to ongoing monitoring and verification. Consequently, in the period from 1992 to 2003, Iraq continued its work on solid and liquid propellant missile systems. The following are examples of what has been learned from the practical experience of the implementation of ongoing monitoring and verification in the missile area.

8. The range of a missile that is fully developed with a known standard payload can be determined on the basis of flight tests or technical documentation. The determination is easy if the missile clearly exceeds the allowable range by a large margin, as in the case of Scud-B and Al Hussein missiles (which have maximum ranges of about 300 and 600 kilometres, respectively). But if a missile's range is somewhere in the vicinity of the permitted value, then expert evaluation and judgement are required since the results of flight tests may depend on particular

environmental conditions. Such was the case when UNMOVIC determined the Al Samoud-2 missile, which was developed during the period from 1999 to 2002 in the absence of international inspectors, to be a proscribed missile. That determination was made on the basis of the assessment of an international panel of experts that judged the missile to be capable of exceeding the permitted range (see S/2003/580).

9. It is well understood that the range of a missile is affected by the payload. However, a payload may vary depending on military requirements. Thus, it is more complicated to establish the possible maximum range of a missile system under development or at the modification stage, since the results of flight tests would depend on multiple parameters, such as fuel load, payload and engine shut-off (burn time), that could be changed at a later stage and could thus affect the range value. Therefore, range alone is an insufficient criterion to make a judgement on a missile under development. Additional technical parameters applied in the course of ongoing monitoring and verification, that could be practicably verified with a minimal degree of ambiguity, have proven to be effective tools that prevented Iraq from developing proscribed missiles in the presence of international inspectors.

10. These parameters included a 600-millimetre limit for the diameter of the airframe of all liquid propellant missiles, the prohibition of any modifications of SA-2 missiles relevant to their conversion into a surface-to-surface mode, the prohibition of tests of SA-2 engines with shut-off valves or modified for extended flight duration and the prohibition of the use of original or modified parts and components of SA-2 missiles for use in a surface-to-surface role. While Iraq did not formally accept these restrictions, it refrained from the production of missile systems that would violate them in the presence of international inspectors until December 1998, when inspectors withdrew from Iraq.

11. After 1991, Iraq retained capabilities to develop indigenously or modify missiles with a range close to 150 kilometres and, due to the nature of missile technology, was technically able to produce missiles that could exceed the prohibited range. However, it did not do so while under ongoing monitoring and verification. The record of ongoing monitoring and verification in the missile area shows that monitoring goals can be achieved through an enhanced verification system comprising on-site inspections, static and flight test observation, use of remote cameras, documents and computer search, tagging of missile hardware in combination with an export/import monitoring mechanism and restrictions on the reuse of missile parts and components from other permitted-range missiles. The absence of international inspectors, the accessibility of critical foreign missile parts and components, and accumulated experience from past missile projects were crucial contributing factors in the resumption of proscribed missile activities by Iraq in the period from 1999 to 2002.

12. Therefore, the evaluation and research of all aspects of Iraq's past missile projects has proved to be a major condition and prerequisite for the development of an efficient monitoring system capable of identifying critical signs and indicators of proscribed activities.

13. The review of Iraq's missile projects demonstrates that liquid propellant missiles are the most likely candidates for modification aiming at the extension of the range of a missile through a payload reduction and increase of fuel capacity. Parts and components of liquid propellant surface-to-air missiles can also be reused in a surface-to-surface role, like the liquid propellant engines of the SA-2 missiles

used in the Samoud-2 surface-to-surface missiles. Accordingly, it is important to reach a full accounting of all SA-2 missiles and their components, especially engines and parts of guidance and control systems, remaining in Iraq. It should be noted that Iraq was not able to produce indigenously liquid propellant missile engines.

14. Conversely, the example of Iraq's development of the Al Fatah missile (see S/2003/580 and S/2003/1135) demonstrates that solid propellant missile technology is more easily attainable in-country for indigenous production.

Example 3 — Determination of biological warfare agent production facilities

15. In 1991, after the adoption of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), Iraq declared that only one facility at Salman Pak had been involved in biological warfare research. No other facilities were declared in connection with its biological warfare programme. Iraq had decided not to declare the full extent of its biological warfare programme and to remove any evidence of its previous existence, but at the same time to retain all remaining associated facilities, equipment and materials.

16. By 1995, in the course of its continuing verification, UNSCOM collected sufficient evidence suggesting that Iraq's biological warfare programme had not been limited to research activities but had also included the production of several bulk biological warfare agents and, possibly, their weaponization. Consequently, in July 1995, under pressure from the inspectors who had acquired procurement information related to the unexplained import of large quantities of growth media, Iraq finally admitted the past production of biological warfare agents at Al Hakam, a dedicated biological warfare facility. After the departure of Lieutenant-General Hussein Kamel from Iraq in August 1995, Iraq further admitted that biological warfare agents had also been produced at two other civilian facilities, the foot-and-mouth disease vaccine plant at Al Dawrah and the agricultural research and water resources centre at Fudaliyah.

17. The account of international verification in the period from 1991 to 1995 exemplifies that even the most clandestine biological warfare programme, such as the one in Iraq, cannot be hidden in its entirety from a comprehensive inspection regime. It also shows the complexity of the determination of past biological warfare activities and provides lessons that are important to consider in cases when concealment policies and practices are actively employed. Prior to the arrival of international inspectors, Iraq cleaned all sites involved in the production of biological warfare agents, removed evidence of past activities, including relevant documents and records, reconfigured equipment, decontaminated and renovated buildings and structures and prepared convincing cover stories.

18. In May 1991, Iraq first identified Al Hakam as a legitimate biological facility intended for the future production of vaccines or other materials produced by micro-organisms such as single-cell protein. The facility was inspected for the first time in September 1991. Several samples taken by the inspectors from different pieces of equipment at Al Hakam were analysed by one outside national laboratory and were reported as negative for the presence of biological warfare agents. Further inspections of this site took place in 1992, 1993 and 1994. The inspectors raised suspicions regarding the true nature of the site and noticed unusual features of the facility, such as the presence of multiple air defence units around its perimeter, the enhanced protection and bunker-style structures, the separation of different areas

within the facility, the rapid construction of the site, implying a strong sense of urgency, its isolation and secrecy, the presence of equipment that had been transferred from other sites, and the weak economic rationale for the purported production of single-cell protein. Although the inspectors believed that the facility could have been planned as the next stage in Iraq's biological warfare programme, no evidence of its actual involvement in Iraq's past biological warfare programme was found. It was assumed that the very low level of biological containment in the facility prevented it from being used for the production of pathogens and that its equipment was not suitable for such production.

19. It was established that timing was critical for Iraq to eliminate much of the evidence of past activities at Al Hakam. Thus, prompt commencement of verification activities at newly declared or identified facilities is essential, especially for biological inspections. The availability of inspectors for deployment at short notice and well-established analytical capabilities, both within the inspection team and in outside laboratories, are required to achieve this goal. Diversified inspection teams, comprising not only experts in the biological warfare field but also specialists in scientific and technical areas relevant to specific activities such as those declared by Iraq at Al Hakam, namely production of vaccines and single-cell protein, would be required to ascertain whether a facility like Al Hakam fits its declared status and purpose by its design, construction, equipment, staffing, budget, etc.

20. Additional experience gained relates to sampling and analysis, which always carry the notion of scientific argument and thus have a strong influence on a final judgement. While positive results of analysis may provide strong forensic evidence and proof, negative samples may easily lead to wrong conclusions and be exploited by the inspected side. In addition, a limited sampling strategy, focused on a few sampling points, risks missing relevant information and may even be counterproductive. An adequate sampling policy comprising environmental, background and investigation-related points in the vicinity of Al Hakam could have enhanced the chances of detecting proscribed materials in the vicinity. Likewise, the use of more than one laboratory for analysis has a reinforcing effect on the results given. To be effective, sampling and analysis require sufficient preparation as well as a constant update of analytical procedures. However, even extensive sampling and analysis could have produced limited results due to the technical limitations of analytical methods available at that time. Thus, it is desirable to keep samples for a sufficient period of time while new, more sensitive methods of analysis are developed.

21. Considerations related to the low level of biological containment were major factors in the initial perception of the unsuitability of Al Hakam for the production of pathogens. These considerations were drawn from microbiological practices and standards familiar to the United Nations biological inspectors, who were considered to be some of the best scientists and engineers in the biological warfare field. However, they were based on elevated expectations on the part of the inspectors regarding the degree of efficiency of Iraq's biological warfare programme, assuming possible production of viral agents and dried bacterial agents. As was subsequently learned, Iraq produced bacterial biological warfare agents at Al Hakam with a moderate risk of airborne contamination due to the generation of aerosols. Thus, by applying the biosafety standards of developed countries it is not always possible to reach conclusions on the type of biological activities being carried out elsewhere.

22. Unlike Al Hakam, which was built as a dedicated biological warfare facility, the foot-and-mouth disease vaccine plant at Al Dawrah was constructed as a legitimate turnkey facility by a foreign company in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The plant was designed for the production of vaccine for three foot-and-mouth disease strains endemic to Iraq. United Nations inspectors, who visited the plant from September 1991 to 1995, identified capabilities existing at the facility to produce biological warfare agents, but concluded that the site was a legitimate facility since no modifications to its original design had been made by Iraq. No evidence of its involvement in Iraq's biological warfare programme was found until Iraq declared its past involvement in 1995. Sampling at this facility was not performed prior to 1995.

23. The most important lesson learned with regard to the experience of the foot-and-mouth disease vaccine plant is that Iraq indeed carried out large-scale production of a biological warfare agent at a legitimate civilian facility. Conversion of a legitimate facility for biological warfare purposes is difficult to detect, especially when such activities take place only for a short period of time, and when the site requires only very minor adjustments for the production of a biological warfare agent. Similar experience was gained regarding another legitimate facility at Fudaliyah also utilized by Iraq's biological warfare programme.

24. It was also found that if a deception campaign is actively pursued, the probability of finding hard evidence of activities related to biological warfare is minimized. The major technical tool that could have helped to identify such facilities is extensive sampling and analysis. Other verification methods, such as the evaluation of documents and records and interviews with staff, are also important, but could be influenced by deception efforts.

25. It should also be noted that the first teams that inspected facilities at Al Hakam, Al Dawrah and Fudaliyah combined two functions simultaneously — site exploitation and site assessment. It has been determined from this inspection experience that a verification system could be more balanced and effective if it provides for a two-stage approach: verification and collection of facts in the course of inspection activities, and a separate evaluation and assessment in the broader scope of proscribed programmes.

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General Assembly
Security Council

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General Assembly
Fifty-ninth session
Agenda items 36 and 148

Security Council
Sixtieth year

The situation in the Middle East

Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Identical letters dated 27 May 2005 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

This week marked the fifth anniversary of Israel's complete withdrawal from southern Lebanon. Israel's total withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May 2000 was in full compliance with Security Council resolution 425 (1978) and has been confirmed inter alia by the Secretary-General, by the Security Council in resolutions 1310 (2000) and 1337 (2001), and by the statement of the President of the Security Council of 18 June 2000.

At the outset, Israel would like to note that it views the recent democratic processes occurring within Lebanon, with the support of the international community, as positive developments for the region, for Lebanon, and for all those interested in strengthening its sovereignty and well-being.

Notwithstanding these positive developments, there are still reasons for concern: although Israel is in full and confirmed compliance with resolution 425 (1978), the Lebanese Government has not yet fulfilled its part of the resolution or met its obligations under the norms of international law, which call for the restoration of international peace and security and the implementation of Lebanese authority over all its territory, including the south.

The lack of Lebanese authority in its southern region, including the border area with Israel, has enabled terrorist organizations and militias to act freely. In fact, recent months have seen a surge in the number of cross-border attacks against Israel and an increase in terrorist activity stemming from Lebanon.

Moreover, most recent inflammatory statements made by terrorist leaders operating in Lebanon risk further escalations and could jeopardize the stability of the region as a whole.

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These developments reiterate the pressing need for the immediate disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias operating in Lebanon.

Israel believes that the extension of control of the Government of Lebanon over all of its territory would represent a basic, important step in the furthering of peace and stability in our region and calls upon the international community to help the Government of Lebanon take all the necessary steps towards this end.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter circulated as a document of the fifty-ninth session of the General Assembly, under agenda items 36 and 148, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Daniel **Carmon**
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

United Nations S/2005/353

Security Council

Distr.: General
27 May 2005

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus

I. Introduction

1. In its resolution 1568 (2004) of 22 October 2004, the Security Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) until 15 June 2005, endorsed my recommendations for the amendment of the concept of operations and force levels of the mission and welcomed my intention to conduct a further review of its operations in advance of the next renewal of its mandate. The present report covers developments from 25 September 2004 to 20 May 2005, bringing up to date the record of activities carried out by UNFICYP pursuant to Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and subsequent Council resolutions.

2. It also contains the findings of the review of UNFICYP, carried out by a joint UNFICYP/Headquarters review team headed by my Special Representative, Zbigniew Wlosowicz and the Acting Director of the Europe and Latin America Division, Office of Operations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Wolfgang Weisbrod-Weber. The joint team assessed the restructuring of UNFICYP and the implementation of its new concept of operations as well as developments on the ground and the operational environment of the force. During its visit to the island, between 6 and 11 May, the joint team sought and took into account the views of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sides, consulted with representatives of the diplomatic community and the United Nations family and held discussions with the representative of the European Commission.

3. UNFICYP continues to be led by my Special Representative and Chief of Mission, Zbigniew Wlosowicz, assisted by the Force Commander, Major-General Hebert Figoli (Uruguay). The strength of the military component stood at 869 all ranks. The strength of the police component stood at 52 (see annex).

II. General background

4. The overall situation in Cyprus remained stable, although the official contacts between the leaders of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sides, which had ceased since the April 2004 referenda, have not been resumed and there is little sign of improvement in relations. Discussions at the regular monthly meetings between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot political party leaders, held under the aegis of

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the Embassy of Slovakia at the former Ledra Palace Hotel, illustrated the differences on core issues of the Cyprus problem. Separate meetings of the leader of the Turkish Republican Party (CTP, a member of the ruling coalition in the north), with the leader of the Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL, a member of the ruling coalition in the south) and the leader of the Greek Cypriot Democratic Rally Party (DISY, the main opposition party) produced no tangible progress beyond general declarations of support for a just settlement.

5. Mr. Mehmet Ali Talat emerged from the April 2005 vote in the north as the undisputed leader of the Turkish Cypriot community. The vote provided renewed evidence of the community's commitment to a peaceful resolution of the Cyprus issue.

6. During the reporting period, there was no substantive change in the position of the sides on my mission of good offices. The Turkish Cypriot leadership and the Government of Turkey have called for a resumption of talks and a solution based on the "Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem", approved by the Turkish Cypriot side but rejected by the Greek Cypriot side in the April 2004 referenda. On 9 May, in Moscow, I had the opportunity for informal consultations with President Papadopoulos and the Prime Minister of Turkey. Following these contacts, a Greek Cypriot delegation arrived in New York on 16 May for preliminary discussions to explore the possibility of resuming negotiations. Consultations were in progress at the time of the finalization of the present report.

7. On 17 December 2004, the European Union (EU) proposed 3 October 2005 to Turkey as a date for the commencement of accession talks. This offer implied an obligation for Turkey to extend the customs union agreement to the 10 new EU member States, including Cyprus.

8. On the island, the benefits of the EU membership of Cyprus are becoming manifest. However, in the area of property, it has opened up new fronts of litigation and acrimony. Already, hundreds of Greek Cypriot claims against Turkey for the loss of property rights in the north are pending before the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, France. Additionally, in 2005, Greek Cypriots approached courts in the south for EU arrest warrants against foreigners buying or selling Greek Cypriot property in the north. In this regard, Turkish Cypriot authorities have warned that they will arrest and detain those attempting to serve court summonses. The prospect of an increase of litigation in property cases on either side poses a serious threat to people-to-people relationships and to the reconciliation process. Property rights continue to be an extremely sensitive issue on both sides and it is widely believed that only a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem can bring closure to the property issue.

9. The work of the Committee on Missing Persons, which resumed on 31 August 2004, is continuing. During three missions of the Inforce Foundation Centre for Forensic Science, Technology and Law (an agency based in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) in October 2004 and January and May 2005, the modalities of an exhumation and identification programme were discussed. At the request of the Committee on Missing Persons, the Foundation conducted a site assessment between 5 and 12 January 2005. However, critical provisions pertaining to the 1981 terms of reference of the Committee and the 31 July 1997 agreement have remained unimplemented.

III. Activities of the Force

A. Prevention of a recurrence of fighting and maintenance of the military status quo

10. The overall military security situation on the island continued to be stable. The two sides refrained from major military exercises and military parades were kept at a low profile. There were no indications of an increase of defence spending nor acquisition of new major equipment; the defence budget in the south has declined. The rotation of Turkish troops and their equipment did not imply a reinforcement. The number of Turkish troops and the nature of their equipment thus remain unchanged and continue to be seen as a threat by the Greek Cypriots.

11. The situation along the ceasefire lines has also remained calm. Since the implementation of the new concept of operations in February 2005, the overall number of incidents has decreased further. There was, however, an increase in incidents in a few sensitive locations. The monthly average number of incidents between November 2004 and January 2005 was 85, compared to a monthly average of 75 from February to April 2005. With two exceptions, the shooting of a Turkish forces soldier by a National Guard soldier with an air gun and a small but provocative exercise by Turkish forces/Turkish Cypriot security forces on the ceasefire line in Nicosia, all incidents were minor and did not constitute a security threat. Overall, the opposing forces have shown cooperation and restraint.

12. The majority of incidents occurred in areas where the opposing forces are in close proximity, in particular in the city of Nicosia. In December 2004, UNFICYP made a proposal to the National Guard and the Turkish forces to withdraw from selected positions in close proximity. This proposal was rejected by both sides. UNFICYP will nevertheless continue its efforts in this direction.

13. The number of air violations decreased from 67, in the last reporting period, to 30; 18 were by Turkish military aircraft, 3 by National Guard military aircraft, 2 by Cypriot police helicopters and the remaining 7 were of unknown origin.

14. Clearing of National Guard minefields in the buffer zone commenced on 18 November 2004. Since then, over 250,000 square metres were cleared and more than 400 anti-personnel and approximately 900 anti-tank mines were removed and destroyed at a demolitions site in the United Nations Protected Area. There has been progress in UNFICYP's negotiations on the arrangements for the clearing of Turkish forces minefields, but full agreement has not yet been reached.

15. On 19 May 2005, the Turkish Cypriot side lifted the restrictions imposed on UNFICYP in July 2000 by the Turkish forces/Turkish Cypriot security forces (TF/TCSF). This will allow UNFICYP to restore its operational capabilities in and around the buffer zone. However, the violation of the military status quo in Strovilia persisted. In addition, the United Nations continues to hold the Government of Turkey responsible for the maintenance of the status quo in Varosha.

16. By 7 February 2005, UNFICYP's military component had completed its reduction in strength and started to implement the amended concept of operations. The strength of the Force at that time stood at about 875 military personnel, including some 15 military officers still needed to carry out civil affairs functions that had not yet been handed over to the civilian police component (see para. 30

below). In accordance with the amended concept of operations, UNFICYP has reduced the number of operational sites from 12 to 4 camps, from 17 to 2 permanent observation posts and from 21 to 9 patrol bases. The force increased the frequency of patrols and extended their duration to prevent operational gaps stemming from the closure of static observation posts. The average number of patrols prior to February 2005 was approximately 50 per day; this number rose to approximately 200 per day between February and April 2005.

17. While the overall reduction of the number of incidents is a positive indicator that the reduction in strength and the amendment of the concept of operations have not led to a deterioration of the security situation, there are indications of anxiety on the part of some of the civilian inhabitants of the buffer zone as well as expressions of concern by both sides about the thinning out of static positions in some specific locations. UNFICYP is taking these indications seriously and will address them to the extent possible within the new force structure. UNFICYP is also planning to increase its air patrolling and to make more efficient use of technology for surveillance.

18. Both opposing forces responded positively to the introduction of a military observer and liaison group within the force. Twelve officers were trained and deployed in January 2005 and have started to be involved in liaison at the regimental level and in the mediation of incidents. A second group of 16 officers has been trained and full operating capability will soon be reached. The experience with this new type of officer is positive and they have already added value to the Force by improving the flow of information and the speedy resolution of incidents. However, the concept and modus operandi is still new, and more time will be required for it to reach its full potential.

19. The review team found that the amended, more mobile concept of operations allows UNFICYP to maintain the same level of mandate implementation with the currently reduced troop strength. The introduction of a military observer and liaison group has started to adequately address and contribute to an increased emphasis on liaison, observation and mediation rather than the interposition of forces, for which UNFICYP still retains some capability. The review team also considered whether further reductions in force strength would be possible at this stage, but concluded that the new concept is still in its early stages and more time and experience will be needed to assess its full impact before taking decisions in this regard.

B. Contribution to the restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions

20. As at 20 May 2005, at the four crossing points opened in the spring of 2003, more than seven million crossings by Greek Cypriots to the north and Turkish Cypriots to the south have taken place, with remarkably few incidents. The opening of additional crossing points at Zodhia/Bostanci in the west of Nicosia and Ledra Street in the old town of Nicosia have been delayed because of the need to clear the areas of landmines and the difficulty in establishing cooperation on practicalities. However, the Zodhia/Bostanci crossing is expected to open soon.

21. While the movement of people has been steady, trade across the buffer zone has been limited by technical and political hurdles, with goods worth less than half a million Cyprus pounds (about 1 million United States dollars) crossing the line since

the EU's green line regulation came into effect last year. In February 2005, the European Council decided to raise the ceiling on personal goods to 135 euros (€) and to expand the list of personal items and agricultural goods that could be taken across the line. The Turkish Cypriot side reciprocated with its own measure with regard to personal goods. The Greek Cypriot side has permitted buses and taxis registered in the north and supplied with the south's documents to pick up tourists destined to the north from the south's ports of entry; however, rental cars from the north are not allowed to cross into the south.

22. The EU Commission recommendation of a €259 million aid package for the north is yet to be acted upon. While the Greek Cypriot side supports the aid package, the Turkish Cypriot side agrees to accept it only together with the Commission's recommendation on direct trade between the north of the island and the EU. The Greek Cypriot side continues to oppose such direct trade.

23. Official contact between the sides is hampered by a high degree of mistrust. On 15 January 2005, three members of a Turkish Cypriot family living in the south were killed on the Larnaca highway in the south. Eight suspects were arrested in the north while all evidence remained in the south. UNFICYP's efforts to assist the sides to bring the suspects to justice proved unsuccessful, and all suspects were released in the north. This case is an illustration of the growing number of crimes across the ceasefire line, such as smuggling, drug trafficking, illegal immigration and human trafficking. These problems are implicit in the expanding inter-communal contacts, which, although positive, have also the potential for adverse consequences if the present lack of cooperation between the two sides persists.

24. The continuing absence of official contacts between the sides has accentuated UNFICYP's role in promoting bicommunal contacts. Although people from either side can meet freely since the opening of the crossings in 2003, the impartiality of the Ledra Palace Hotel venue and the United Nations umbrella are considered indispensable for sensitive humanitarian and other meetings, including those of political parties from the north and the south. It is hoped that under the auspices of UNFICYP, contacts may be established between the sides, without prejudice to their political positions, on humanitarian and related issues generating a climate of trust and easing tensions. During the reporting period, UNFICYP provided facilities for 57 bicommunal events, including those implemented by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)/United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), bringing together 2,500 Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots.

25. UNFICYP's support of projects designed to maximize opportunities for civil use of the buffer zone continued. UNFICYP facilitated projects in the infrastructure, farming and ecological areas, including the construction of a gas bottle storage facility in the buffer zone in sector 2, the building of a garage and store near Dherynia, the extension of stables on the Pyla plateau, the maintenance of a road between Mammari and Dhenia, the cleaning of the Klimos river bed and land consolidation schemes and the drilling of water wells. The restoration of the 14th century Venetian castle in the mixed buffer zone village of Pyla, which was facilitated by UNFICYP and funded by the EU, was completed in December 2004. UNFICYP sought and obtained agreement from the village's football associations to revive the mixed youth football team, which had been disbanded in 1968.

26. UNFICYP continued to carry out its mandated humanitarian tasks in support of the 404 Greek Cypriots and 149 Maronites living in the northern part of the

island. At the end of November 2004, UNFICYP arranged for an icon to be brought from the south for the service at Apostolos Andreas monastery. Additionally, through UNFICYP mediation, permission was granted for a second priest to be installed in the Karpas. In spring 2005, UNFICYP obtained permission from the Turkish Cypriot side for the remainder of the full complement of teachers for the Greek Cypriot elementary and secondary schools at Rizokarpaso.

27. In March 2005, the Greek Cypriot side pledged to UNFICYP that it would open a Turkish secondary school in the south. UNFICYP has lent its good offices to the sides to work out the practicalities. In the south, UNFICYP also assisted Turkish Cypriots in obtaining identity documents, housing, welfare services, medical care, employment and education.

28. In the absence of a political office in UNFICYP, the civil affairs component continues to assist the Senior Adviser and the Chief of Mission in political and civil affairs negotiations with the two sides as well as in political analysis and reporting.

29. The need for the Force's assistance in incidents on one side involving Cypriots from the other side has increased. UNFICYP civilian police and civil affairs officers monitored and followed up on more than 60 cases of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots involved in unauthorized crossings, photography, traffic violations, accidents, burglary, assault, illegal possession of firearms and drug trafficking. The Greek Cypriot side instituted criminal proceedings in 10 cases involving Turkish Cypriots, while the Turkish Cypriot side brought proceedings against Greek Cypriots in eight cases. UNFICYP civilian police officers visited Turkish Cypriots detained in the south and Greek Cypriots detained in the north as a result of these proceedings and monitored trials and outcomes. During the same period, UNFICYP's civilian police component facilitated 11 prison visits of families of Turkish Cypriots detained in the south and 14 medical evacuations from the north to the south.

30. Due to delays in the deployment of additional civilian police officers, the sector civil affairs teams continued to be staffed with military officers. However, in order to prepare for the smooth transfer of the sector civil affairs teams to the civilian police component, a civilian police officer was attached to the military teams in the sectors to observe and assist in the preparation of the transition. Civilian police officers have also started coordinating patrols with the military along the buffer zone. The overall number of patrols has increased from 1,520 between November 2004 and January 2005, to 2,180 between February and April 2005. A civilian police officer has also been attached to the sector 2 military operations room, which organizes, inter alia, activities in relation to the Ledra crossing. Since March 2005, civilian police officers carry out the weekly humanitarian visits to UNFICYP's liaison office in Limassol, in keeping with the practice of civilian police officers accompanying UNFICYP's humanitarian patrols and welfare visits to the Greek Cypriots in the Karpas and the Maronite villages in the north and to the Turkish Cypriot quarter in Paphos in the south. The UNFICYP liaison post at the Greek Cypriot village of Leonarisso in the Karpas continues to be manned by military staff, but civilian police officers are expected to take over in September 2005, providing an opportunity to strengthen relations with their counterparts there.

31. The number of civilian police tasks is expected to increase with the expected opening of additional crossing points, in particular the Zodhia/Bostanci crossing, where UNFICYP's civilian police will need to patrol the road through the buffer

zone since neither side exercises jurisdiction beyond their respective ceasefire lines. In addition, as mentioned earlier (see para. 23 above), there is an increase in crime across the ceasefire line, which, while primarily a responsibility of the two sides, will also add to the workload of the Force's civilian police component.

32. The review team found that the civilian police and civil affairs tasks have continued to increase in number and complexity, as have the requests from both sides for assistance. It is therefore important that Member States make available the additional officers needed to bring the actual strength of UNFICYP's civilian police component up to the authorized strength of 69.

IV. Financial aspects

33. As indicated in my previous report (see S/2004/756), the General Assembly, by its resolution 58/301 of 18 June 2004, appropriated for UNFICYP the amount of $51.9 million, including $2.2 million for strengthening the security and safety of the staff and premises of the Force. In this regard, I am grateful for the voluntary contribution of one third of the cost of the Force, equivalent to $16.4 million, from the Government of Cyprus, and the voluntary contribution of $6.5 million from the Government of Greece. Other countries and organizations might wish to do likewise, in order to lower the portion of the cost of UNFICYP covered by assessed contributions.

34. My proposed budget for the maintenance of UNFICYP for the period from 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006, which amounts to some $44.3 million, is currently under consideration by the General Assembly, with its action thereon expected shortly.

35. As at 30 April 2005, the total outstanding assessed contributions to the special account for UNFICYP for the period from 16 June 1993 to 15 June 2005 amounted to $14.1 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at the same date amounted to $2,218.8 million.

V. Observations

36. The situation in Cyprus has been calm but, in the absence of a viable political process, the distrust between the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot side has persisted, as has the military posture and the concomitant perception of threat. In this situation, I continue to believe that the presence of UNFICYP on the island remains necessary for the maintenance of the ceasefire and in order to foster conditions conducive to a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem. The review conducted in pursuance of resolution 1568 (2004) found that this view is shared by both sides on the island, as well as by the guarantor Powers and other interested parties.

37. UNFICYP enjoys good cooperation from both sides. In this connection, I note with satisfaction the lifting of restrictions of movement of UNFICYP by the Turkish Cypriot side.

38. I share the view of the review team that the restructuring of UNFICYP and the amended concept of operations will allow UNFICYP to implement its mandate in an

effective and efficient manner. However, delays in the recruitment and deployment of staff have not allowed the new concept to reach its full potential. With the strengthening of the civil affairs and civilian police components in UNFICYP, the increase in mobility in the military component and the inclusion of a military observation and liaison group, the mission is moving in the right direction. However, more time will be required to assess the full impact of the present changes and the need for any further adjustments. Meanwhile, the UNFICYP civilian police component urgently needs to be brought up to strength, and I thank those Member States who have made commitments for contributions of additional officers. Until this is done, UNFICYP will need to retain the additional 15 military personnel (in addition to the authorized strength of 860) currently engaged in civil affairs activities.

39. I therefore recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of UNFICYP for a further six-month period, starting on 16 June 2005 and ending 15 December 2005, with the present authorized strength and concept of operations. During this time, we will keep the operations of UNFICYP under close review, and I will revert to the Council in the event that major changes are warranted.

40. I do not believe that the time is ripe to appoint a full-time person dedicated to my good offices. The Chief of Mission will continue to act as my Special Representative on the ground for contacts at the highest level with the two sides and other key actors on the Cyprus question. However, I intend to dispatch, on an ad hoc basis, a senior official from the Secretariat to visit Cyprus, Greece and Turkey to assess the situation on the ground in the light of recent political developments.

41. In conclusion, I wish to express my appreciation to Zbigniew Wlosowicz, my Special Representative and Chief of Mission in Cyprus, the Force Commander, Major-General Figoli, and to the men and women serving in UNFICYP for the efficiency and dedication with which they have discharged the responsibilities entrusted to them by the Security Council.

Annex

Countries providing military and civilian police personnel (as at 20 May 2005)

	Military personnel
Argentina[a]	295
Austria	4
Canada	1
Croatia	2
Finland	2
Hungary	84
Ireland	1
Slovakia	202
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	278
Total	**869**
	Civilian police
Australia	15
Croatia	2
India	11
Ireland	18
Netherlands	6
Total	**52**

[a] The Argentinean contingent includes soldiers from Bolivia (1), Brazil (1), Chile (15), Paraguay (16), Uruguay (2) and Peru (14).


وزع قوة الأمم المتحدة لحفظ السلم في قبرص في أيار/مايو ٢٠٠٥
2005年5月的联塞部队部署
UNFICYP DEPLOYMENT AS OF MAY 2005
DÉPLOIEMENT DE L'UNFICYP AU MOIS DE MAI 2005
ДИСЛОКАЦИЯ ВСООНК НА МАЙ 2005
DESPLIEGUE DE LA UNFICYP EN MAYO DE 2005
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
HQ UNFICYP
HQ UNCIVPOL
FMPU
Mobile Force Reserve Company
UN Flight (ARGCON)
Force Engineers
HQ SECTOR 2 (BRITCON)
HQ Company
One Company
UNCIVPOL Stn
HQ SECTOR 1 (ARGCON)
HQ Company
Two Companies
UNCIVPOL Stn
UNCIVPOL Stn
Liaison Post Karpas
Liaison Post Strovilia
HQ SECTOR 4 (SLOVCON / HUNCON)
HQ Company
One Company
UNCIVPOL Stn
FAMAGUSTA
NICOSIA
UNPA
SECTOR 1
SECTOR 2
SECTOR 4
KYRENIA
LARNACA
LIMASSOL
PAPHOS
AKROTIRI S.B.A.
DHEKELIA S.B.A.
UNCIVPOL Stn
Two UNCIVPOL Stns
FMPU Detachment
UNCIVPOL Stn
Airport, airstrip
Aeroport, piste d'atterrissage
Аэродром, взлётно-посадочная полоса
Aeropuerto, pista de aterrizaje
District boundary
Limite de district
Граница округов
Limite de distrito
Cease-fire lines of Turkish forces
Lignes du cessez-le-feu des forces turques
Линия прекращения огня турецких войск
Líneas de cesación del fuego de las fuerzas turcas
Cease-fire lines of Cyprus National Guard
Lignes du cessez-le-feu de la Garde Nationale Chypriote
Линия прекращения огня Национальной Гвардии Кипра
Líneas de cesación del fuego de la Guardia Nacional Chipriota
UNFICYP operational boundaries
Limites des zones d'opérations d'UNFICYP
Оперативные рубежи ВСООНК
Límites de las zonas de operaciones de la UNFICYP
The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
Map No. 2930 Rev. 57 UNITED NATIONS May 2005
Department of Peacekeeping Operations Cartographic Section

United Nations S/2005/354

Security Council

Distr.: General
31 May 2005

Original: English

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming resolutions 1576 (2004) of 29 November 2004 and 1542 (2004) of 30 April 2004, and *recalling* resolution 1529 (2004) of 29 February 2004, relevant statements by its President, as well as the Security Council's report on its Mission to Haiti from 13 to 16 April (S/2005/302),

Determining that the situation in Haiti continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, as described in section 1 of operative paragraph 7 of resolution 1542 (2004),

1. *Decides* to extend the mandate of MINUSTAH, as contained in resolution 1542 (2004), until 24 June 2005, with the intention to renew for further periods;

2. *Welcomes* the Secretary-General's report S/2005/313;

3. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

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United Nations A/59/820–S/2005/355

General Assembly
Security Council

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1 June 2005

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General Assembly
Fifty-ninth session
Agenda item 29
Question of Cyprus

Security Council
Fifty-ninth year

Letter dated 31 May 2005 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus continue to support efforts to find a comprehensive settlement to the Cyprus issue within the framework of your good-offices mission and on the basis of the plan which is being referred to as the Annan plan. The Turkish side has clearly demonstrated its resolve in this regard, and will continue to do so. With that understanding, Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus will hold consultations with the United Nations delegation that will visit the region this week.

The rejection of the plan by the Greek Cypriot side in the referendum held in Cyprus on 24 April 2004 and the following accession of the Greek Cypriots to the European Union created an entirely new situation on the island. However, the Turkish Cypriots, though having fulfilled their responsibilities on the way to a solution by voting overwhelmingly in favour of the plan, continue to face difficulties arising from ongoing political, economic, cultural and social isolation.

Although, following the referendum, the European Union as well as certain international organizations and a number of countries on a bilateral basis made some efforts for the lifting of the unjust restrictions imposed on the Turkish Cypriots, unfortunately nothing substantial came out of those initiatives. Turkish Cypriots continue to live under difficult conditions, which they have been facing for the last 40 years.

In order to put an end to this inhumane situation and bring about normalcy in the day-to-day dealings between the two sides of the island, Turkey calls upon all relevant parties to simultaneously lift all restrictions. It will be recalled that the Turkish side already took constructive steps towards that end in the past. The unilateral decision of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus to open border crossings on the island on 23 April 2003 and the decision of the Government of Turkey to facilitate the travel of Greek Cypriots to Turkey are only two examples in that regard.

In this context, on 30 May 2005, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül publicly made the following proposals, to be adopted

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and implemented as a whole, which represent another concrete initiative for paving the way to reaching a just, durable and comprehensive solution:

(a) Free movement of people, goods and services to and from the Turkish Cypriot side, as well as between the North and the South;

(b) Lifting of total restrictions applied to all sea and airports, including direct flights;

(c) Elimination of restrictions regarding third-country nationals;

(d) Special arrangements for the direct inclusion of North Cyprus as an economic entity in the European Union customs union and for enjoyment of its full benefits by all Turkish Cypriots;

(e) Removal of all obstacles that prevent the Turkish Cypriot side from participating in international sports, culture and other activities.

The preceding proposals conform with the repeated calls of the international community, particularly by the United Nations, the European Union, the Council of Europe and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, made after the referendum, with a view to integrating the Turkish Cypriots with the world.

I would be grateful if the text of this letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 29, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Baki **İlkin**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2005/356

Security Council

Distr.: General
1 June 2005

Original: English

Letter dated 27 May 2005 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) and to Security Council resolution 1599 (2005) establishing a one-year follow-on mission on Timor-Leste, the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL), which will remain in Timor-Leste until 20 May 2006.

It is my intention, subject to the Council's approval, to appoint Sukehiro Hasegawa (Japan) as Head of UNOTIL, with effect from 21 May 2005.

Mr. Hasegawa will thus continue to serve as my Special Representative for Timor-Leste, having succeeded Kamalesh Sharma (India) as Head of UNMISET on 21 May 2004. Mr. Hasegawa has also been serving as the United Nations Resident Coordinator for Timor-Leste since July 2002 and previously served as my Deputy Special Representative for Timor-Leste from July 2002 to 20 May 2004. I would like to put on record my appreciation for his leadership of UNMISET over the past year.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kofi A. **Annan**

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United Nations S/2005/357

Security Council

Distr.: General
1 June 2005
English
Original: French

Letter dated 1 June 2005 addressed to the Secretary-General by the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 27 May 2005 (S/2005/356) concerning your intention to appoint Mr. Suhekiro Hasegawa (Japan) Chief of the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They take note of this information and of the intention expressed in your letter.

(*Signed*) Jean-Marc **de La Sablière**
President of the Security Council

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United Nations A/59/821–S/2005/358

General Assembly
Security Council

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1 June 2005

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General Assembly
Fifty-ninth session
Agenda item 29
Question of Cyprus

Security Council
Sixtieth year

Letter dated 31 May 2005 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 27 May 2005 addressed to you by Reşat Çağlar, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I would be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 29, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Baki **İlkin**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

05-37001 (E) 030605

Annex to the letter dated 31 May 2005 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letter dated 8 April 2005 addressed to you by the Greek Cypriot representative in New York and circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council (A/59/777-S/2005/234), which contained distorted and misleading information regarding a lawsuit brought against Turkey by a Greek Cypriot at the European Court of Human Rights.

It should be mentioned at the outset that the decision of the Court (Third section) in the application by Myra Xenides-Arestis against Turkey (No. 46347/99) is a preliminary decision on admissibility. The Court considered that, in the light of the parties' submissions, the complaints raise serious issues of fact and law under the European Convention, the determination of which requires an examination of the merits.

The Third Section does accept the view that international law recognizes the legitimacy of legal arrangements and transactions in certain situations akin to those existing in TRNC, thereby rejecting the view put forth by the applicant and the intervening third party (the Greek Cypriot Administration) that Law No. 49/2003 of TRNC providing for compensation for Greek Cypriot property in North Cyprus, has no valid legal basis in international law. Although the Court does not consider the remedy provided under Law No. 49/2003 to be adequate, it gives a reasonably clear indication of changes TRNC could make to that Law to meet the requirements of an effective domestic remedy. The Court's extensive references to the provisions of Law 49/2003 throughout its decision clearly demonstrate the importance the Court attached to the question of domestic remedies in TRNC. Moreover, the Court does not reject Turkey's arguments for, or accept the applicant's and the Greek Cypriot arguments against, the possibility of an effective domestic remedy under article 35 (1) of the Convention being introduced after an application has been filed but before a decision on admissibility has been made.

It may be recalled that the Annan plan provided for the establishment of a property board to deal with applications relating to property affected by events since 1963, and not merely by events since 1974. The plan acknowledged that the reciprocal property issue in Cyprus needed a sui generis solution. This indeed shows that the issue of property in Cyprus is recognized as being too complicated to be amenable to settlement by way of individual application to the Court, such as that by Myra Xenides-Arestis.

It was thought that the Compensation Commission established under Law 49/2003 would have gained more significance after the Greek Cypriot side, on the instigation of the Greek Cypriot Administration, had rejected the Annan plan. That Administration has, however, also taken drastic measures to prevent Greek Cypriots from applying to the Compensation Commission. Such measures have amounted to threats and stigmatization of those who might apply to the Commission.

It should be emphasized that the reciprocal property issue in Cyprus needs a political solution. The landscape in Cyprus has undergone significant transformation over the past decades and it is not possible now to turn the clock back as though nothing has changed. The Greek Cypriot side has also taken measures as to the

expropriation of Turkish Cypriot property in the South of the island. All Turkish Cypriot properties in the South have, by virtue of a law passed by the Greek Cypriot parliament, come under the administration of the Greek Cypriot authorities, who refuse claims of possession by Turkish Cypriots. Moreover, such properties have extensively been compulsorily acquired or subjected to de facto expropriation. The Greek Cypriot authorities have made public statements to the effect that compensation shall not be paid to any Turkish Cypriot until there is a political settlement in the island.

On the other hand, contrary to its position relating to Turkish Cypriot property in the South, the Greek Cypriot Administration is encouraging applications against Turkey in the European Court of Human Rights, as well as the commencement of legal proceedings in the courts in the South. Moreover, arrest warrants are being issued by the courts in the South against the present users. Such measures that are being encouraged and sponsored by the Greek Cypriot Administration not only ignore the accrued rights of the Turkish Cypriots but tend to prolong their political and economic isolation and restrict their freedoms.

It should be urged upon the Greek Cypriot Administration that such measures complicate further the issue of property in the island and undermine the relations between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots and therefore have a negative effect on efforts for an overall political settlement in the island.

(*Signed*) Reşat **Çağlar**
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

United Nations S/2005/359

Security Council

Distr.: General
2 June 2005
English
Original: French

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions and statements of its President relating to the situation in Côte d'Ivoire,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of Côte d'Ivoire, and *recalling* the importance of the principles of good neighbourliness, non-interference and regional cooperation,

Recalling that it endorsed the Agreement signed by the Ivorian political forces in Linas-Marcoussis on 24 January 2003 (S/2003/99) (the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement) approved by the Conference of Heads of State on Côte d'Ivoire, held in Paris on 25 and 26 January 2003, and the Agreement signed in Accra on 30 July 2004 (the Accra III Agreement),

Welcoming the efforts of the Secretary-General, the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) towards re-establishing peace and stability in Côte d'Ivoire,

Welcoming, in particular, the mediation efforts undertaken by Mr. Thabo Mbeki, President of the Republic of South Africa, on behalf of the African Union, and *reaffirming* its full support for him,

Welcoming the signature by the Ivorian parties on 6 April 2005 in Pretoria of the agreement on the peace process in Côte d'Ivoire (the Pretoria Agreement), under the auspices of President Thabo Mbeki, and *expressing* its satisfaction with the first steps which have been undertaken by the Ivorian parties in order to implement this agreement, in particular with the agreement on the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process reached on 14 May 2005 and the restoration of the status of the Ivorian Radio and Television to that it enjoyed before 24 December 2004,

Reaffirming its resolutions 1325 (2000) of 31 October 2000 on women, peace and security, 1379 (2001) of 20 November 2001 and 1460 (2003) of 30 January 2003 on children and armed conflict as well as its resolutions 1265 (1999) of 17 September 1999 and 1296 (2000) of 19 April 2000 on protection of civilians in armed conflict,

Expressing grave concern at the allegations of misconduct of some peacekeeping troops deployed in African countries, including the sexual exploitation, *affirming* that these troops should limit their behaviour in line with

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their code of conduct and *reaffirming* that there will be a zero-tolerance policy of any illegal misconduct or sexual exploitation and abuse in all peacekeeping troops,

Having taken note of the report of the Secretary-General of 18 March 2005 (S/2005/186),

Having also taken note of the letter of the Permanent Representative of the Republic of South Africa of 24 May 2005 (S/2005/340),

Expressing its concern at the continued deterioration of the security and humanitarian situation, in particular in the West of the country,

Determining that the situation in Côte d'Ivoire continues to pose a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Endorses* the Pretoria Agreement and *demands* that all the signatories to the agreement and all the Ivorian parties concerned implement it fully and without delay;

2. *Stresses* in this regard that non-respect, by the signatories to the Pretoria Agreement, or by any other Ivorian party concerned, of any of the commitments made in Pretoria in the presence of President Thabo Mbeki would endanger the peace process in Côte d'Ivoire and would constitute an obstacle to the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement and the Accra III Agreement, and therefore *reaffirms* its readiness to implement paragraphs 9 and 11 of resolution 1572 (2004) if the parties fail to meet their commitments under the Linas-Marcoussis and Pretoria Agreements;

3. *Commends* President Thabo Mbeki for the essential role he has played, on behalf of the African Union, to restore peace and stability in Côte d'Ivoire, *reaffirms* its full support for his mediation efforts, *reminds* the signatories to the Pretoria Agreement that in the event of differences in the interpretation of all or part of the agreement, they should seek a ruling from President Thabo Mbeki and *encourages* the Secretary-General, President Thabo Mbeki and the African Union to continue to collaborate closely in the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement;

4. *Takes note with satisfaction* of the provisions of the Pretoria Agreement reaffirming the determination of the signatories of the Agreement regarding the need to organize presidential elections in October 2005 and legislative elections following immediately thereafter, as well as their agreement to invite the United Nations to participate in the work of the Independent Electoral Commission and the Constitutional Council and in the organization of the general election, and of the decision by the Council of Ministers on 28 April 2005 to hold the first round of the presidential elections on 30 October 2005;

5. *Welcomes* the decision taken by President Thabo Mbeki with regard to the eligibility for the Presidency of the Republic, as described in the letter he sent to Mr. Laurent Gbagbo, President of the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, on 11 April 2005 (S/2005/270), and *takes note with satisfaction* of the announcement made by President Laurent Gbagbo on 26 April 2005 that all candidates nominated by the political parties signatory to the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement would be eligible for the presidential elections;

6. *Demands* that all the Ivorian parties take all necessary steps to ensure that the forthcoming general elections are free, fair and transparent;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General, on the basis of the Pretoria Agreement, to designate, as an exceptional arrangement, after consultations with the African Union and President Thabo Mbeki, a High Representative for the elections in Côte d'Ivoire (the High Representative), autonomous from the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), to assist in particular in the work of the Independent Electoral Commission and of the Constitutional Council, without prejudice to the responsibilities of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and with the following mandate:

(a) To verify, on behalf of the international community, that all stages of the electoral process, including the establishment of a register of voters and the issuance of voters' cards, provide all the necessary guarantees for the holding of open, free, fair and transparent presidential and legislative elections within the time limits laid down in the Constitution of the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire,

(b) To provide, in close co-operation with UNOCI and the mediation, all necessary advice and guidance to the Constitutional Council, the Independent Electoral Commission and other relevant agencies or institutes to help them prevent and resolve any difficulty which may jeopardize the holding of open, free, fair and transparent elections within the time limits laid down in the Constitution of the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, with the authority in this regard to make necessary determinations,

(c) To report immediately to the Security Council through the Secretary-General, and to inform the mediator of the African Union, President Mbeki, any difficulty which may jeopardize the holding of open, free, fair and transparent elections, and to submit to them, as appropriate, such recommendations as he may see fit to make,

(d) To keep the Security Council, through the Secretary-General, and President Thabo Mbeki regularly informed of all aspects of his mandate,

(e) To request and receive information and technical advice from UNOCI as well as other sources;

8. *Decides* that the mandate of the High Representative as referred to in paragraph 7 above will end after the forthcoming general elections in Côte d'Ivoire;

9. *Calls upon* the community of donors to provide all the necessary financial resources to the High Representative to support the full implementation of his mission;

10. *Takes note* of the agreement on the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process and on the restructuring of the armed forces signed on 14 May 2005 in Yamoussoukro by the Chiefs of Staff of the National Armed Forces of Côte d'Ivoire (FANCI) and the armed forces of the Forces Nouvelles (FAFN), *demands* that the parties implement fully this agreement so that the DDR process can start without delay, *reaffirms* in this regard paragraphs 9 and 11 of resolution 1572 (2004), *reaffirms also* paragraph 8 of resolution 1584 (2005) regarding the establishment of a comprehensive list of armaments in their possession and *demands* the immediate disarmament and dismantling of militias throughout the national territory;

11. *Decides* that the mandate of UNOCI and of the French forces which support it shall be extended until 24 June 2005, with a view to renew it, in this specific instance, for a period of 7 months;

12. *Authorizes* the Secretary-General to begin the necessary planning and preparations, including troop and police generation as well as required support and other arrangements, to facilitate a timely deployment in the event that the Security Council decides to increase UNOCI's authorized strength of troops and police and to adjust its mandate;

13. *Underlines* the importance of mainstreaming the gender perspective in peacekeeping operations and post-conflict peacebuilding and of appropriate expertise in this regard, and *encourages* UNOCI to actively address this issue;

14. *Urges* donors and international financial institutions to provide the necessary support to the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement, in particular the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme and the electoral process, through the expeditious allocation of financial resources;

15. *Calls upon* all parties to cooperate fully in the deployment and operations of UNOCI, in particular by guaranteeing the safety, security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel as well as associated personnel throughout the territory of Côte d'Ivoire;

16. *Welcomes* the efforts undertaken by UNOCI to implement the Secretary-General's zero tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and to ensure full compliance of its personnel with the United Nations code of conduct, *requests* the Secretary-General to continue to take all necessary action in this regard and to keep the Security Council informed, and *urges* troop-contributing countries to take appropriate preventive action including the conduct of pre-deployment awareness training, and to take disciplinary action and other action to ensure full accountability in cases of such conduct involving their personnel;

17. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to keep the Council regularly informed of the developments of the situation in Côte d'Ivoire, the implementation of the mandate of UNOCI and of the Linas-Marcoussis and Pretoria Agreements, and to report to it in this regard every three months;

18. *Requests* also France to continue to report to it periodically on all aspects of its mandate in Côte d'Ivoire;

19. *Invites* the African Union to keep it regularly informed of the implementation of the provisions of the Pretoria Agreement and to make recommendations to it as it deems necessary;

20. *Expresses* its full support to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General;

21. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.